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1 Anyone grappling with the problem of the status and justification of the “Philosophy of
Law” as a philosophical  discipline has to address a series of  extraordinarily intricate
problems.  The first  problem is  that  of  explaining why the institutionalisation of  the
discipline is so characteristically modern: did Hugo’s Philosophie des positiven Rechts (1798),
Austin’s Philosophy of  Positive Law (1861) and Hegel’s  Philosophie des  Rechts  (1821) truly
herald a new discipline or simply a new name for a kind of philosophical reflection that
was already ancient and traditional? This problem depends on one’s philosophical stance
on natural law.
2 The second problem relates the historical and thematic bifurcations characteristic of our
discipline:  first,  the bifurcation stemming from the opposition between “jurists’  legal
philosophy”  and  “philosophers’  legal  philosophy”  (Bobbio  1990)  and,  secondly,  the
bifurcation resulting from the opposition between “philosophy of law” versus “theory of
law”. This problem depends on one’s philosophical stance on legal positivism.
3 In this paper, I plan to focus primarily on the second problem. My purpose is to make a
case for the strictly philosophical nature of our discipline. This means that I must first
take a prior stance on the issue of what philosophy is in general, outline the minimal
premises for the definition of philosophical rationality and establish a meta-theoretical
classification of the genres of philosophical discourse (Sec. 2). This will then lead me to
undertake a critical examination of Bobbio’s dichotomy between jurists’ legal philosophy
and philosophers’ legal philosophy (Sec. 3). Thirdly, it is essential to tackle the thorny
issue of reformulating the existing relationships between legal philosophy as a “special”,
“sectorial”,  “applied”  or  “regional”  discipline  as  opposed  to  a  “general”  (or  “pure”,
“fundamental”, “essential”, etc.) philosophy. Here we find a convergence between the
generic  problem of  what  the  “parts”  of  philosophy are,  in  the  general  sense  of  the
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discipline  (logic,  epistemology,  ethics,  anthropology,  natural  philosophy,  etc., even
though they themselves are also often seen as “special” philosophies) and the specific
problem posed by a philosophical discipline which is, furthermore, explicitly “centred”
around a particular institution associated with concepts of its own, as is the law (in this it
is  comparable  to  other  “philosophies  of”:  philosophy  of  religion,  philosophy  of  art,
philosophy of history, etc.). I shall re-examine this problem using the distinction between
concepts of law and ideas of law (Sec. 4). Fourthly, I shall defend the thesis that, when
ascertaining the type of philosophy the philosophy of law is —or should be—, the most
decisive factor is not so much (or not only) the relationship between philosophy of law
and philosophy in general as, more importantly, the relationship between it and law itself
(Sec. 5). I argue that the nature of law itself makes its practice inevitably and ineluctably
associated with philosophical ideas and conceptions. This practical view of law is tightly
bound with a view of legal philosophy as a practical philosophy, and this is the main
thesis I shall defend here. Different expressions of this practical view of law can be found
in prominent contemporary authors who go beyond the dichotomy of legal positivism-
natural law (such as Nino, Alexy, Dworkin, Atienza). The essential feature which I regard
ties philosophy of law to the condition of some “practical philosophy” is the role played
by the concept of value, i.e. the centrality and pre-eminence of its evaluative dimension. 
The fundamental ideas of the philosophy of law are thus values, in the sense of practical
ideas (Sec. 6). Hence, legal philosophical discourse has to remain close to the practice of
law and is necessary for it. What gives legal philosophy a special place (even a kind of
“pre-eminence”)  within  the  general  realm  of  practical  philosophy  is  its  privileged
perspective on practical fundamental values (that is, moral and political values), due to
its proximity to the practice of law, which is the institution whose mission is precisely to
reconcile conflict and restore the unity of these values in justifiable and argumentative
terms. This approach allows us to go beyond the dichotomy between natural law (that
claims that values constitute the ultimate underpinning of law, but in the sense of a
dogmatic  or  metaphysical  philosophy)  and  legal  positivism  (defined  by  evaluative
distance and neutrality regarding law, but in a sceptical or relativistic sense, postulated
more as a scientific than as a strictly philosophical discourse of law).
 
2 A general conception of philosophy 
4 I will adopt the view of the philosophy of law as the “rational and critical totalisation of
the phenomenon of law”, as suggested by Manuel Atienza.1 The key to this conception
(which was inspired by the Spanish philosopher Gustavo Bueno)2 lies in the distinction
between concepts and ideas.  Concepts  are  inherent  to  the sciences  (in a  broad sense,
including technical fields), while ideas are the very stuff of philosophy. Both —scientific
concepts and philosophical ideas— are “critical totalisations” (“criticism” is not exclusive
to  philosophy)  and  both encompass  universality.  However,  the  totalisation  and
universality of ideas is not the same as,  and cannot be reduced to the totalisation of
concepts. Philosophical problems abide by their own format: they are neither technical
nor scientific problems, but rather emerge directly or spring up at the same time as
technical or scientific problems, representing a second degree of reflexivity. Philosophy
is not an original or “first-degree” body of knowledge. It is independently justified as a
unique,  substantive  body  of  knowledge  and  cannot  be  reduced  either  to  simple
“adjectival”  knowledge,  doomed  to  be  “liquidated”  by  the  sciences;  or  “genitive”
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knowledge, confined to a simple logical analysis or encyclopaedic synthesis in relation to
scientific knowledge. Nor, obviously, can it be reduced to some kind of “dogmatic” or
“metaphysical” knowledge, disconnected from the sciences.
5 Without question,  the sciences are the most universal  exponent of  knowledge at  our
disposal.  However,  theirs  is  a  universality  that  is  restricted  or  bound  to  certain
conceptual domains (or “universes of discourse”) which are more or less closed according
to objective theories and laws. Following a traditional nomenclature, Bueno called these
domains  “categories”:  the  physical,  chemical,  mathematical,  anthropological,
sociological, psychological and other categories. Scientific concepts (including techniques
and technologies)  would be  universal  relative  to  or  within each of  these  categorical
domains,  filtering out everything that is  conceptually irrelevant,  or external  to them.
However, for this very reason, everything that can be said rationally about each category
individually or about all of them together (i.e., on the conceptualisation of the world)
would  not  be exhausted .  Thus,  at  the  very  least,  questions  such  as  the  relationships
between these diverse categories  (how many sciences there are  and how they differ
among each other), their scope (how far the universality of each science stretches) and
their  validity  (what  it  means  to  consider  a  given  scientific  knowledge  universally
grounded) could no longer be resolved from inside the categories themselves, as they do
not constitute scientific or technical problems to be analysed using their own conceptual
instruments.  On the  contrary,  they  require  a  different  kind of  rational  treatment,  a
totalisation of a different type, one that is also universalist. And this, precisely, is what
philosophical discourse is. There would then be another genre of “second-tier” concepts,
the universality of which cross-cuts and cannot be reduced to the categorical concepts.
These are transcendental concepts in that they “transcend” each of the categories, but not
all of them as a whole (just like the three classical ideas of traditional metaphysics laid
out by Kant in his first Critique).3 These concepts could actually be called philosophical
ideas, once again following a tradition that begins with Plato and reaches down to Kant
and Hegel, although this does not mean that we are required to adhere to the traditional
idealist conception of metaphysics. Ideas are neither separated forms, nor a priori units of
knowledge, nor figures of an unfolding Spirit; rather, they can be viewed as ideas in an
historical-cultural sense, bearing in mind that although associated with “ideologies” in
the  Marxist  sense,  they  cannot  be  understood  merely  as  ideological-conjunctural
contents either.  Philosophical theories are therefore nothing other than more or less
systematic elaborations and interpretations of  these ideas throughout their historical
development. They thus reflect problems which have been sparked repeatedly by the
concepts of the sciences, yet they resist being equated with or reduced to mere scientific
or  technical  problems.  As  they  involve  ideas  and  not  only  concepts,  philosophical
problems truly have their own format. They are not resolved by the sciences or techniques
but  instead  reframed by  them  (hence  their  historical  persistence).  A  philosophical
problem is characterised primarily by the fact that it questions an entire category as a
whole, and does so in a particular way, connecting it to others and inquiring into its
foundations and validity.  This  is  what  happens,  for example,  with epistemological  and 
ontological questions, which question how categories represent or conceptualise the world
and how the world is represented or conceptualised by them. The answer to this requires
a kind of totalising reflection which encompasses criticism —that is analysis, comparison,
classification, setting limits— of the scientific concepts themselves according to more or
less  systematic  general  conceptions  which deal  with epistemological  ideas  (a  certain
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theory of science or of knowledge) and ontological ideas (a certain theory of the elements
which make up the real).
6 So how does this “critical totalisation” translate in relation to law when defining legal
philosophy? Firstly, we have to specify the meaning of this notion of “totalisation”, and
then we must be able to give precise meaning to the cliché of the “critical” nature of the
philosophy of law.
7 Regarding the former, Atienza specifically associates the meaning of this totalisation with
the transcendental and inter-categorical nature of legal philosophy. Thus, he maintains that
“the essential function of philosophers of law should be that of acting as ‘intermediaries’
between legal knowledge and practices on the one hand and all other social practices and
knowledge – including philosophy – on the other”, and that “its place lies precisely in the
frictions and vacuums produced by their functioning and interaction. Therefore, legal
philosophy may claim to be a totalising knowledge inasmuch as its points of departure and
arrival are these other knowledges and practices (Atienza 2015: 5).
8 Regarding the latter,  Atienza assumes that the critical  dimension of  legal  philosophy
stems from the fact that it adopts “a perspective that does not match that of those who
are  situated  inside  each of  these  parcels,  as  the  philosopher  of  law can and should
question  the  established  frameworks,  an  approach  forbidden  to  one  who  operates
exclusively from inside a given science or technique (who, naturally, does not relinquish a
critical approach but rather exercises it differently)” (Atienza 2015: 5).
9 Both features,  as we can see,  are largely similar.  And both lead us to pose the same
problem: how is it  possible for the philosophy of law, which is “focused” on a single
category,  to  be  genuinely  “philosophical”,  that  is,  for  it  to  be  a  totalising-critical
(transcendental  or  cross-categorical)  discourse?  In  other  words,  if  what  makes  legal
philosophy a  unique and specific  discourse  is  its  “cross-categorical”  or  “transversal”
nature in relation to the different conceptualisations of the phenomenon of law —both
internal and external to the legal category— how can it still be a “regional” philosophy in
the twofold sense of being a philosophy distinct from “general” philosophy while also
being  “local”  or  “particular”  in  nature  (that  is,  associated  with  legal  discourse,  a
discourse  which  is  obviously  used  locally  and  particularly)?  How  could  these  two
characteristics  be  made  compatible:  its  “genitive”  legal  nature  and  its  universal  or
philosophically “transcendental” nature?
 
3 Jurists’ legal philosophy and philosophers’ legal
philosophy
10 This  leads  us  to  a  related  problem  —famously  posed  by  Bobbio—  which  is  the
controversial  duality  between  jurists’  legal  philosophy  and  philosophers’  legal
philosophy. This problem stems from the fact that the tradition of Western philosophical
thinking on law has historically occurred in a “bifurcated” fashion: by philosophers who
come to law from their omni-comprehensive systems of ideas seeking to fit it into them,
and by jurists  who somehow draw from certain general  philosophical  frameworks to
construct theories that are also omni-comprehensive,  but whose scope primarily falls
within the field of law, or which are essentially focused on reflecting and developing legal
categories. We can easily illustrate this bifurcation by contrasting Aristotle and Cicero in
the ancient world; Augustine and Gratian or Thomas Aquinas and Bartolus in the Middle
Legal philosophy as practical philosophy
Revus, 34 | 2018
4
Ages;  and  “philosophers’  natural  law”  (Suárez,  Leibniz)  and  “jurists’  natural  law”
(Grotius, Thomasius) in the modern period. Ever since philosophy of law emerged as a
new discipline in the contemporary era —replacing natural law, which was, in fact, legal
philosophy— it  has  been  cultivated  almost  exclusively  in  law faculties  instead  of  in
philosophy  faculties.  That  is,  its  main  practitioners  are  jurists.  This,  coupled  with
academic specialisation, has increased the endogamous bias of legal philosophy (as well
as the isolation of general philosophy from the “closed garden” of law, in Bobbio’s words).
However,  it  is  true  that  legal  philosophers  have  continued  to  draw  from  general
philosophies, both current and past (thus, Kelsen cannot be understood without Kant,
Hart without Wittgenstein,  Finnis without Thomas Aquinas,  Alexy without Habermas,
hermeneutics  without  Gadamer),  which  nonetheless  are  given  a  new  and  different
dimension, driven by a reflexive interest in the law and in developments in legal practice
(thus, Kelsen has said much more about legal duty than the neo-Kantians, and the same
holds true of Hart compared to Wittgenstein on legal rules, and Alexy on the theory of
legal  discourse compared to Habermas).  Therefore,  the relationship between the two
—“regional” legal philosophy and general philosophy— is a complex one. It is primarily
couched in truly controversial terms because of the fact that, after the decline of natural
law, the entrenchment of legal positivism as a core, dominant vein in contemporary legal
thinking went hand-in-hand with a parallel tendency to liquidate the substantive aspect
of philosophy (a feature it  shares with both general 19th-century positivism and neo-
positivism). This is yet another case of what Bueno (1970: 56) calls the “positivistic death”
of philosophy. In this way, the philosophy of law claims to be a discourse “by and for
jurists”  instead  of  “by  and for  philosophers”:  that  is,  a  technical-practical  discourse
inherent to the category of law. Even the nomen  “philosophy of law” is disappearing,
dissolving into the more generic “theory of law”, the latter (in the continental tradition)
meant  as  a  discipline  with  primarily  scientific4 or  doctrinal  pretensions  —a  “high
dogmatics” constructed in the mould of the positivistic Allgemeine Rechtslehre— or (in the
Anglosaxon tradition) jurisprudence. That is to say, it is a legal-categorical rather than a
“philosophical” discourse in both cases. Legal positivism, in Radbruch’s celebrated words,
thus “euthanizes” philosophy of law in that the latter sees itself as “part” of a “previously
given”  philosophical  system  in  the  traditional  style.  It  is  not  philosophy  which
determines  the  unity  of  ideas  in  a  “top-down”  reflection  on  the  law,  but  rather
categorical  legal  experience,  inasmuch  as  it  provides  the  materials  for  “bottom-up”
building, as Bobbio claims.5
11 The  preference  for  jurists’  philosophy  of  law  is  unquestionably  backed  by  an
extraordinarily powerful argument: the empirical reference to the legal category, to legal
positivistic  concepts  and  to  the  real  practice  of  law.  Legal  philosophy  should  be  a
“philosophy  of  positive  law”  built  upon  the  problems  faced  by  contemporary  states
governed by the rule of  law,  along with their  complex technical  legal-administrative
organisation  or  progressive  constitutionalisation,  as  opposed  to  a  speculative  or
unproductive reflection (metaphysical or dogmatic).6 However, the issue is whether this
proximity  to  legal  categorical  experience  may  not  also  act  as  an  obstacle —and  not
necessarily an advantage— to constructing a truly philosophical-critical discourse around
the law. That is, the question is whether self-understanding of the philosophy of law as a
“jurists’ philosophy” cannot also lead it to become ancilla iurisprudentiae, in a reflection
indistinguishable from that of legal specialisation, a mere professional propaedeutics, a
philosophical patchwork or bricolage adjunct to jurisprudence,7 in short, yet another part
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of legal  ideology in the broad (though not necessarily negative)  sense.  This situation
could be compared, mutatis  mutandis ,  to that which entails simply admitting that the
philosophy of religion only makes sense when made by, and when serving, the adepts or
theologians of a given denomination. This risk of “dogmatism” has not only been fostered
by  the  discipline’s  aforementioned  specialisation  and  institutional  location,  but  also
largely by the methodology of legal positivism, in which the prioritisation of the doctrinal
(or “internal”) point of view has led the concept of law to become insular and detached
from  other  categories,  both  social-scientific  and  political-moral.  The  thesis  of  the
separation between law and morality,  the “purity” of  the theory of  law,  the neutral
descriptive or evaluative study of “what law is” instead of what it “ought to be”, and the
consideration  of  all  “external”  perspectives  as  irrelevant  to  jurists,  are  well-known
expressions of this methodology, which leads one to conclude that the philosophy of law
must be alien to moral philosophy, political philosophy, social philosophy and the like. In
other words, legal philosophical discourse is doomed to be relevant only to jurists rather
than a  subject  of  interest  to “philosophers” or  one about  which they have anything
interesting to say.
12 And this is the core point that I wish to discuss with regard to the need to rethink and
redefine  the  status  of  the  philosophy  of  law.  Not  just  any  discourse  about  law  can
genuinely be called philosophical, even if it bears this name, nor can all philosophical
discourse about law be labelled dispensable or dogmatic as such. The contrast that Bobbio
formulated  is  actually  based  on  a  false  dilemma.  The  aprioristic  dismissal  of
“philosophers’  philosophies  of  law”  is  gratuitous:  it  is  not  actually  targeted  against
“philosophy” itself but against a particular philosophy whose assumptions or theses are
deemed dogmatic, scholastic or metaphysical by another particular philosophy (in the
case of Bobbio, from legal positivism).8 Likewise, the preference for “jurists’ philosophy of
law” can (and in my opinion, should) be accepted without this meaning embracing an
insular or purely endo-legal approach. Legal philosophy can only be truly philosophical if
it  is  critical  in  nature,  and  this  means  that  it  must  be  positive  but  not  positivistic,
associated  with  the  concept  of  legal  experience  but  not  dogmatic,  coextensive  with
practical  legal  discourse  but  not  merely  “genitive”.  That  is,  it  requires  an  inter-
categorical perspective,  a “totalisation” which results in making relevant connections
between the legal category and other categories.9 This is the path followed by the post-
positivistic philosophy of law. But this totalisation can only occur in terms of ideas and
theories that must necessarily be drawn from a general philosophical conception, and
this  means  that  all  legal  philosophy  (including  positivistic  legal  philosophy)10 is  the
“application”  of  philosophemes.  In consequence,  to  paraphrase  Kant,  it  is  not  clear
whether “the servant”, i.e., philosophers’ legal philosophy, “is the mistress’s torchbearer
or train-bearer”.11
13 According to the approach posited above, the philosophy of law —just like any other
philosophical discipline— should refer to philosophical ideas which form the common
thread binding regional philosophy to general or transcendental philosophy. These ideas
would  essentially  be  of  two  kinds:  epistemological  and  ontological.  Thus,  the
philosophical method is one and the same (regardless of whether it is practised by jurists
or philosophers) and can only consist of this twofold movement which starts from the
categorical concepts (or the problems caused by them, which we shall discuss below),
analyses them in terms of second-order ideas or concepts, and then returns back to them
to offer a new synthesis or re-composition in light of a conception that forges relevant
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(inter-categorical) relationships among them. Thus, if these are the two methodological
or  dialectical  moments  of  philosophical  rationality  —regressus and  progresssus —  it  is
simply  because  the  categorical  concepts  can  be  analysed  either  according  to  the
relationships among each category and the kind of knowledge or conceptualisation that fit
within  them  (the  kinds  of  knowledge,  studies,  sciences, etc.)  or  according  to  the
relationships among those kinds of knowledge and the categorical realities to which they
refer  (what  domain of  the world they encompass,  what  entities  they attest  to,  what
connections or laws they determine, what kind of objectivity they allow for, etc.). Put
more simply and applied to the matter at hand: legal philosophy devises a map of legal
knowledge and realities.
 
4 The law: concept or idea?
14 We have said that what justifies the substantiveness of the philosophical perspective is
the need that emerges, within the internal conceptualisation of a given category, for a
second-order  totalisation  in  terms  of  omni-comprehensive  ideas  or  schemes  that  go
beyond such a category —critically— and connect  it  to other categories  or  concepts.
However, the goal is not simply to “apply” this understanding of philosophical rationality
to  the  philosophy  of  law.  This  would  be  the  error  of  a  dogmatic  (aprioristic  or
metaphysical) conception of philosophy, as Bobbio correctly pointed out.12 Instead, the
goal  is  to show how this  kind of  rationality  is,  and always has  been,  present  in the
philosophy of law itself (just like in any other philosophy) once the philosophical method
is being put into practice. Indeed, the presence of the same method of rationalising legal
phenomena following a two-way path between the categories or concepts of law and
certain philosophical ideas has been in constant practice in legal philosophy ever since
ancient Greece. Even though in the Natural Law, Kantian and Hegelian traditions, this has
tended to be limited to a single idea, i.e. justice, in contrast to the “concept” of law, it is
nonetheless unjustified: the repertoire of legal-philosophical ideas is much broader and
encompasses all legal-categorical concepts. We could claim that the inner structure of
these concepts is already constituted by philosophical ideas. Philosophy of law does not
“create” the ideas but finds them already operating in law and then proceeds to organise
and systematise them “on a second tier”, rather than “apply” them top-down.
15 This also makes it possible to grasp the fact that legal philosophy has always been a
legally implemented philosophy, i.e.,  a system of ideas with either a revolutionary or
emancipating purpose or a conservative and legitimising purpose with respect to the
legal realities in any given period of time. This is a very important aspect of what it
means to be a practical philosophy. Both the philosophical methods and the objective
ideas with which it works have taken on different meanings in law through the very
evolution of legal forms. Philosophy of law has always kept in line with the historical
development of legal phenomena. This is how the historical relationships between Roman
law and mediaeval ius commune or common law and Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy
can be interpreted. Incidentally, Bobbio’s omission of Aristotle is particularly glaring, as
he  is  the  source  of  the  very  idea  of  jurisprudence,  which  underlies  a  significant
epistemological understanding of the theory and practice of law common to all Western
traditions.  Another illustration of  this common evolution is  the relationship between
rational legal  philosophy and Enlightenment philosophy with regard to the historical
process  of  State  formation,  and  the  positivisation  of  modern  national  law.  In  both
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examples we can find jurists’ —and not just philosophers’— (natural-law) philosophies.
And so we can understand that if the philosophy of law has emerged with this name
precisely in the modern period, associated with the conglomerate of doctrines which we
call “legal positivism”, this is because positive law itself has substantially transmuted its
configuration  and  structure,  thus  calling  for  a  new  theoretical  reflection.  Thus,
paraphrasing Hegel, legal philosophy could be defined as a legal era captured in thinking,
that is, in ideas, beginning with the very general conception of law, which should then
not be a concept but rather a philosophical idea.13
16 If  we  accept  a  functional-historical  conception  of  legal  philosophy  such  as  the  one
outlined above —that  is,  not  a  metaphysical  or  dogmatic  one— we can see  that  the
organisation of its inherent ideas has to be sought not so much from within (or in the
“philosophers’” philosophy) as from the categorical reality which it seeks to analyse, i.e.
the law itself. This is a consequence of understanding that the ideas we are discussing
exist within the historical and social process (unlike any aprioristical metaphysics), and
that  they  do  not  belong  to  an  ideal topos  uranos  (nor  yet  are  they  mere  ideologies
associated  with  groups  or  classes).  Changes  in  the  legal  realities  are  what  lead  to
philosophical ideas which, in turn, allow us to better reconstruct and understand those
changes and influence them by means of new ideas. For this reason, before answering the
questions of how the philosophy is applied to law or to what purpose, we must question why
this application is needed: why the law needs to incorporate any philosophical reflection,
whether it comes from jurists or philosophers.
17 To develop the thesis suggested in this question, we have to consider two issues. The first
is what it means to say that law is a “category”. The second is to identify what kind of
“critical  totalisation” is  relevant in this regard in order to yield a true philosophical
reflection.
18 i)  Considering  whether  law  is  a  category  is  tantamount  to  inquiring  into  the
conceptualisation (epistemology) and reality (ontology) of legal phenomena. It would be
difficult  to  find a  view of  law that  denied that  this  categorical  nature  is  essentially
practical,  inasmuch  as  it  is  an  institutionalised  social  technique.  Its  “positivity”  is
associated with this fact (and it is no coincidence that the practical category of law is the
first  place  where  this  very  idea  of  “positivity”  emerged,  before  “positivism”).  Even
natural  law,  as a  dualist  theory  of  law,  must  include  the  “social  thesis”  that  legal
positivism rendered redundant: only what is produced by human practices is (or stops
being) “law”, with no need for further qualification. The “technical” dimension of law is
inseparable from its “artificial” nature as an activity or product of agents who are, not
coincidentally, called legal “operators”. The categoricity of law is also associated with its
normativity. Legal institutions (legislative, judicial, executive) consist of linked practices
aimed  at  continuously  producing  and  applying  norms.  They  are  also  second-order
practices in that legal institutional operations have a social anchor: they assume given
practices and norms, and their purpose is to establish a certain order with regard to these
practices and norms, interfering in their course by means of operations and decisions.
The institutional structure of law is thus situated in a middle ground between moral
institutions and political  institutions.  The legal  norms that  result  from this  practical
institutional  structure  are  viewed  as  the  ultimate  social  norms  —that  is,  final  or
definitive, not of course morally infallible norms.
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19 ii) If we accept these extremely broad premises, they should yield the key to the notion of
“totalisation” to which we have been referring. Atienza (1989: 371–2) boils this idea down
to its essence:
The role  of  the philosophy of  law in legal  culture as  a whole is  similar  to  that
performed by law in society overall. The law is said to be a system of social control
because it oversees and somehow directs the way social institutions operate; the
juridical is not an attribute exclusive to certain social sectors or institutions but
rather —once again using C. Nino’s metaphor— it is something that is everywhere,
just like air in the physical world. Nor does the philosophy of law have a bounded,
exclusive terrain within all legal and social knowledge; its terrain is instead to be
found in the relationships among these diverse sectors of culture.
20 If  legal  philosophy  is  a  totalising  reflection,  it  is  because  law  per  se is  a  totalising
institution, a pars totalis of society as a whole which, precisely for this reason, demands
recourse to philosophical ideas of a certain kind.
21 When asked about the concept of law (quid ius), Kant is famous for having said that jurists
can only respond tautologically by referring to “what the law is” (quid iuris), that is, to
“what the laws in a given place and given time say or have said”. This “purely empirical”
reference to the categorical nature of law or legal positivity is, Kant alleged, insufficient:
“a merely empirical theory that is void of rational principles is, like the wooden head in
the fable of Phædrus, fine enough in appearance, but unfortunately has no brain”. By this
he was pointing to the need to adopt a philosophical perspective: it is essential to seek a
“rational”  way that  is  grounded in the concept  of  law,  “abandoning those  empirical
principles and searching for their sources in pure reason”.14 But what I somehow want to
explore is the path opposite to the one discussed by Kant. The ideas of legal philosophy
should not be sought in any “pure” aprioristic reason but rather in categorical  legal
practices  themselves.  When  they  establish  “what  the  law  is”  (i.e.,  what  is  legally
regulated) they are already, by necessity, assuming some conception about what the law is
(quid ius), and these conceptions are precisely those which involve the philosophical ideas
that make up the sphere of reflection of legal philosophy. Thus, the goal is to show that
the practicality of the legal category is actually not merely empirical and does not entail a
mere denotative allusion to “legal practices” or to law as a “social practice” in the sense
of  a  “matter  of  fact”  (as  the positivists  also  often view it),  but  that  it  also  includes
elements of universality that lead it to transcend its factual dimension (though without
necessarily entering into metaphysics). Such universal elements — which, as we shall see,
are  simply  values—  are  the  necessary  components  of  legal  rationality,  of  the  very
discourse  of  law,  and  they  make  its  concepts  characteristically  extend  beyond  the
categorical framework from which they emerged.
 
5 Ubi ius, ibi philosophia
22 What gives conceptualisations of the legal category a philosophical scope is not merely
the fact that they contain “totalisations”. Totalisations are common to any category, just
as any scientific or technical category entails exercising criticism at some level. As we
have already said,  the uniquely philosophical form of totalisation appears in a multi-
categorical and therefore transcendental context. And this holds true of legal concepts
inasmuch  as  their  practical  and  normative  nature  implies  connection  and  synthesis
among different categories: moral, political, social, economic, etc. The kind of normative
totalisation  which  is  characteristic  of  the  legal  category  brings  it  to  the  verge  of
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philosophy. While this does not mean that the purpose of law is to “solve philosophical
problems”, it should nevertheless imply that the practical problems of law cannot be
solved without using philosophical ideas and conceptions. Additionally, we should not
lose sight of the fact that the very origins of philosophy in Greece were closely tied to
discussions of all sorts of problems —logical, moral, political, etc.— closely related to legal
categories.15
23 Yet in addition to this multi-categorical definition, there is a second feature of the legal
category that forces its concepts to make “totalisations” without ceasing to be concepts.
Because  it  is  institutionalised,  the  law  is  a  collective  practice,  an  aggregate  of
extraordinarily complex and highly internal specialised sub-institutions —at least where
legislative,  executive  and  judicial  functions  can  be  minimally  differentiated—  which
operate according to decisions of diverse subjects through extensive periods of time. This
multiple diversity of functional parts means that unity and coherence of purposes within
legal  practice  are  only  possible  if  it  incorporates  specific  devices  of  reflective
rationalisation to carry out its functions of producing and applying norms. The law is
thus largely a corpus of “doctrine”, that is, normative practice plus theory, connected
internally. Its facet as a technique for social control is inseparable from its dimension as
reflective, “ideological”, doctrinal technique, which implies a high degree of abstraction
in its approach to social agency. Legal practice depends on a complex conceptual and
theoretical  instrumentarium in  which we can discern two different  genres. 16 The first
contains the formal doctrines or theories which outline the technical and methodological
resources and procedures associated with legal practice as a “formalist” practice, that is,
centred on legal norms in their role as “forms” or structures through which it intervenes
in social action (primarily rules and principles). These doctrines substantially supply the
legal  norms  with  an  identification,  classification  and  rank  (a  theory  of  the  legal
“sources”), as well as the results and procedures used to implement them in practice (a
theory of  method or interpretation).  The second genre contains the material  theories
which  supply  overarching  conceptions  of  the  substantive  normative  contents,  the
purposes  and  values  which  the  legal  system  is  geared  towards  achieving  via  the
aforementioned techniques and methods (e.g.,  a theory of constitutional rights).  Both
kinds of theories or doctrines, which are eternally intertwined, comprise a legal ontology
and epistemology, that is, a working “philosophy of law”. They form what has been called
“legal paradigm”, “legal reason”, “legal ideology” or “shared legal consciousness”, which
can also be seen as a true “worldly” or “professional” philosophy of law, or a “jurists’
spontaneous  philosophy” which encompasses  a  self-conception of  law ad  intra and a
“legal  conception of  the  world”,  that  is,  an ad  extra interpretation of  reality  (social,
political,  economic,  natural)  stemming  from  legal  rationality  as  a  second-order
rationality.
24 A third fundamental aspect of these totalisations of legal rationality which decisively
brings  their  format  closer  to  philosophical  totalisations  is  related  precisely  to  this
dimension of second-order normativity. I am referring to the fact that it has a dialectical 
constituent  nature;  that  is,  it  is  structurally  associated  with  conflict,  deviation,
incompatibility,  contradiction,  incommensurability  and controversy.  Therefore,  its
rationality  essentially  consists  of  deploying  strategies  aimed  at  using  discourse  and
argumentation to manage and disentangle these conflicts and incommensurabilities. This
is obviously related to the fact that the law as a social institution is primarily charged
with  being  “the  last  resort”  (ultima  ratio)  and  has  a  coercive  monopoly  on  conflict
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resolution  and  the  enlisting  of  cooperation  and  coordination  on  a  collective  scale. 
However, precisely because of this, its norms and decisions are the outcome of a “syntax”
or  composition  of  essential  plural  or  heterogeneous  parts  or  elements  which  are  in
constant conflict and imbalance. There is no need to belabour the fact that this is also
true  of  both  producing  laws  (legislative,  constitutional)  and  applying  them (judicial,
administrative).  The  logical  construction  of  kinds  or  types  of  action  and  the
individualisation and specification of the particular practical situations arising from them
are a form of totalisation, and the same holds true of the finalistic reasoning (composition
of  interests  and  objectives)  and  balancing  deliberation  (composition  of  values)  from
which legal norms and decisions result. In both cases, the practical problems that are
addressed by the law are therefore very similar to philosophical problems. They both
entail conflicts whose very nature somehow compromises or puts in question the entire
category and exceeds it “from the inside out”. The most common manifestation of this
goes beyond the fact that each legislative or judicial decision entails a holistic regressus to
the entire “legal system” as a whole (Dworkin’s “integrity” for instance). Furthermore,
this systematisation cannot merely be logical or formal. The legal system is not a “logical
system”  but  a  “practical  system”,  one  that  is  doctrinal,  prudential  or  justificatory
(although, of course, its justifications cannot avoid logic).  And this means that rather
than  being  a  “closed”  category  by  application  of  its  very  internal  conceptual  and
theoretical methodology (as would be the case if it were a scientific category), it is a
methodology that presupposes the essentially “open” nature of legal practice. In other
words,  its “closure” can only occur by incorporating elements from other categories.
Given that the law is a second-order system, these elements cannot be anything other
than the overarching purposes and values that the legal system strives to materialise in
the first-order social practices, purposes and values that the law itself does not create but
rather  recreates  and  shapes  in  practical  terms.  Thus,  we  are  dealing  with  the
incorporated  contents  which  we  called  “material  theories”  above,  substantive
conceptions that  are necessarily political-moral  (and therefore “philosophical” in the
sense noted) and which legal practice necessarily merges with.
 
6 Legal philosophy as practical philosophy 
25 If  legal  rationality  is  presented this  way,  as  “philosophical”  conceptions  that  are  an
internal, necessary part of law itself as a doctrinal system, then law should have its own
“genitive” philosophy of law. Theoretical conceptions usually considered to belong to
academic philosophy of law (legal positivism, formalism, natural law, constitutionalism,
realism,  etc.)  also  shape  jurists’  own  “professional  philosophy”  in  itself;  this  is
particularly visible in the more abstract doctrinal strata of legal practice, which are also
the most far-reaching (such as constitutional  courts). Therefore,  the point of  contact
between legal philosophy as a discipline and law itself is to be found here: philosophical
conceptions of law are an internal part of its practice, and the theories that shape legal
practice partly overlap with the philosophy of law.
26 Legal philosophy in the strict or academic sense could then be defined as any formally
philosophical reflection aimed at systematising ideas which already have some level of
reflective categorical development within law. Here is where, as mentioned above, we
must considerably adjust Bobbio’s general assessment of the contrast between jurists’ and
philosophers’ legal philosophy. This contrast distorts the fact that any philosophy of law,
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no  matter  whose  it  is,  has  always  consisted  in  applying  more  or  less  systematic
philosophical schemes to law (and it is impossible to see how it could be otherwise). On
the one hand, Bobbio does not pay enough attention to the fact that law is a historical-
cultural institution which poses general philosophical problems for any philosophy. As
such, law has always been present in the ideas coined by the great general philosophers
in the Western tradition, a part of which, since Aristotle, has been known as “practical
philosophy”  (politiké),  which  encompasses  moral  or  ethical  philosophy,  political
philosophy and social philosophy in general. Suffice it to mention the very idea of “law” (
lex), the practical use of which is the outcome of the synthesis of different categorical
conceptions: moral, scientific, legal. The “persistent questions” (Hart) raised by law are
general philosophical problems, such as its origin and its relationship with the ideas of
normativity, power, society, justice, morality or scientific truth. On the other hand, the
general preference for jurists’ philosophy of law is unjustified. Because of their training,
jurists are best poised to undertake a philosophical  reflection based directly on legal
categories (which is imposed on them by their own methodology), and this explains why
academic  legal  philosophy  has  primarily  been  cultivated  by  “jurist-philosophers”.
However, this in no way guarantees complete immunity from metaphysics or dogmatism.
In any historical period, jurists have appropriated general philosophies when devising
their  doctrines  (indeed,  the  very  category  of  legal  has  always  needed  a  covering  of
philosophy with which to build its internal meta-theory). It could be claimed that not a
single philosophical doctrine has failed to receive an incorporation or adaptation from
the field of law (Thomism, Kantism, Marxism, Hegelianism, pragmatism, phenomenology,
neo-empiricism, analytical-linguistic philosophy, hermeneutics, discourse theory, post-
modernism and any other philosophical “-ism”). The examples of “applied” philosophy
that  Bobbio  censures  are  also  the  work  of  jurists,  and not  just  of  philosophers  who
“speculatively”  descend  to  the  field  of  law.  This  proves  that  the  “application”  of
philosophical  systems itself  does not  deserve the aprioristic  label  of  metaphysical  or
dogmatic —but rather those specifically applied theses, concepts, and methods.17
27 Instead, what the history of legal philosophy shows us is a continuum of ideas which all
converge in law and are modulated differently (but not in a mutually exclusive way) by
general historical philosophical systems and by the academic philosophy of the law as a
discipline embedded in the law. Jurists’ philosophical conceptions, which are, as we have
seen, internal totalisations of the very category of law required by the kinds of problems
dealt with by the practice of law, are where the two intersect. These conceptions are
unquestionably  the  best  available  philosophical  entryway  into  the  law,  in  that  they
supply the basic repertoire of legal-philosophical ideas and, in this sense, must be capable
of being incorporated by any philosophy of law that does not seek to be metaphysical or
disconnected from legal experience. Yet they must also be the target of criticism and
reframing in general or transcendental philosophical terms, rather than being viewed as
inherent to a purely endo-legal or intra-categorical discourse. And that criticism means
that legal philosophy must necessarily interweave with moral philosophy and political
philosophy;  that  is,  it  must  be  constructed  within  the  framework  of  some  practical
general conception of philosophy viewed in a transcendental perspective. Below we shall
very schematically examine some of the main arguments upholding this claim.
28 The  core  argument  leads  us  to  once  again  consider  the  kind  of  totalisations  that
characterise the legal category and are expressed in its internal conceptions. They are
essentially justificative totalisations. Given that the law is a practical, normative category,
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legal concepts are doctrinal concepts. Their main purpose as practical concepts is not only
to  guide  action  (the  “technical”  aspect),  but  to  do  so  in  a  justifiable  fashion.  Legal
concepts are linked to the practice of arguing and providing reasons in regard to legal
decisions, of justifying action (ex post and ex ante). This means that what we have called
the ideas that shape legal practice until now, are actually “ideals”18 or, in Kantian terms,
“regulative ideas”.19 That is, they are values.
29 Values are the true transcendental building blocks of legal practice. This could be asserted
after  examining any inventory  of  the  fundamental  legal  concepts,  such as  “person”,
“action”,  “rule”,  “illicit”,  “sanction”,  “responsibility”,  “right”,  “duty”,  etc.,  which
represent a categorisation of the basic notions of practical philosophy (the traditional
philosophia  practica  universalis).  Dealing with these essentially justificatory concepts in
legal practice is what makes it  necessary to draw from conceptions (which we called
“materials” above) that are capable of supplying versions or interpretations of them in
terms of conglomerates of foundational value judgements. These evaluations are at the
very  core  of  the  legal  method,  which  actually  starts  with  the  assumption  of  the
“openness”  or  “indeterminacy”  of  the  legal  system  and  the  need  to  “close”  it  or
determine its content by referring to practical justifications of this kind.20 Legal concepts
are always elisions of value judgements.21 The entire technical-practical complex of the
law —primarily made up of rules as elemental instrumental units of the jurist’s work— is
the  outcome  of  deliberations  and  balances  between  values,  and  thus  the  practical
application of  the concepts captured in them is inseparably linked to the underlying
value  judgements  and the  need to  rationally  ground them in  objective  validity.  The
disagreements  which  lie  at  the  origin  of  rules  —as  “expressions  of  compromises,  of
judgements  about  the  outcome  of  conflicts”22—  are  constantly  reproduced  in  their
process  of  application,  so  that  determining  the  “grounds  of  law”  in  each  new  case
requires  making  explicit  the  values  at  stake,  and  ultimately  their  ethical-political
foundations. Hence, it is essential to gain some conception of the principles (which are the
normative expression of  values)  and to wholesale reconstruct  the law involved in the
resolution of each case in legal practice, even if this may only seem particularly visible in
difficult  cases  or  in  legal  issues  that  typically  spark  moral  disagreements  (abortion,
euthanasia, gay marriage, surrogate motherhood, etc.).  All legal issues, including easy
cases, are questions of principle in this sense, that is, questions of value.23
30 It is therefore necessary, in Atienza’s words, “to resort to a moral and political philosophy
that allows some order to be articulated or established among the different kinds of
justifying reasons that converge in law”.24 This philosophy encompasses combinations of
ideas  on  the  common  good,  the  general  interest,  human  rights,  collective  goals  or
purposes, etc. and is ultimately resolved in some kind of foundation of the basic ethical
and moral values (freedom, equality, dignity) and the political values which justify power
and authority (a conception of democracy, of the rule of law, etc.). That is, it is resolved in
what, we have called since Aristotle,25 justice as a basic schema to articulate ideas around
what is good and right in distribution and reparation in both the public and private
matters  that  make  up  the  territorium of  human praxis.  In  this  way,  the  justificative
dimension of law connects it internally, from its own practice, to philosophical-moral and
philosophical-political conceptions. It leads to general or omni-comprehensive systems of
practical philosophy (with an orientation that can be liberal, utilitarian, communitarian,
deontological, social, etc.) from which, in turn, the orientation and normative critique of
those legal conceptions take place. These normative functions essentially correspond to
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the academic philosophy of law, the natural middle ground between law and practical
philosophy, which is then shown to be a practical undertaking. The philosophy of law is a
practical philosophy that follows the law, like its shadow. The values it encompasses, as
both transcendental underpinnings and ideas from practical philosophy simultaneously,
serve as a bridge, allowing a back and forth movement between the two.
31 We  could  even  claim  that  legal  philosophy  is  that  region  (or  “part”)  of  practical
philosophy that enjoys a certain “primacy” over the others. After all, law is not only a
place  where  political-moral  values  are  realised  and  embodied  (a  decisively  effective
embodiment due to the fact that legal institutionalisation manages public coercion) and
where these values thus gain a definitive justification, but also the place where moral
philosophy  and  political  philosophy  converge  on  equal  terms  from  their  own
transcendental  perspectives.  Indeed,  legal-practical  institutions  appear  to  be  their
necessary landing place. They can play the role of a historical-cultural mesh necessary to
make morality and political society possible, without which their values would simply
disintegrate. Law represents not only a society’s ideological self-description but also its
own  political  and  moral  self-justification,  where  all  practical  values  are  ultimately
“personified”,  that  is,  attributed  to  the  community  as  a  whole (a  clear  form  of
“totalisation”). Law is thus associated with the very idea of “public reason”.26 This is a
thread running throughout the history of practical philosophy from Aristotle to Kant, just
to cite its two touchstones.
32 We  can  thus  understand  the  profound  sense  in  which  the  genuinely  philosophical
perspective on law can be viewed as teamed with the notion of “critical totalisation”. It
essentially has to do with the justificative purpose of law, which operates on the basis of
practical values. The point is not only the prevalence of this justificative dimension of law
over its technical or directive dimension, since the problems it deals with encompass
conflicts and disagreements that are ultimately axiological and need to be resolved on
equal  terms.  Nor should the practice of  law be governed by a  method that  seeks to
constantly  construct  and  reconstruct  the  coherence  or  “integrity”  of  legal  matters.
Justifying (the legal method) would then appear as a complex interpretative action that
effectively  entails  “totalising”  every  case  by  virtue  of  multiple  criteria  (relevance,
description, applicability, truth, appropriateness, weighing, etc.) in order to integrate it
into the legal system “as a whole” (Dworkin 1986: 400-1, 411), somehow recapitulating the
entire set of technical instruments of positive law in each decision. The point is also, and
above all, that this requires going beyond the legal category to reveal law as a precisely
political-moral technique. Legal technique as a whole and each of the decisions made within
it throughout its constant development (in this second reflective level on social practices)
must  appear  as  a  justified  practice  that  serves  the  values  of  justice  and  morality.
“Inclusive” integrity, in turn, refers back to a “pure”,27 aspirational integrity on whose
terms law as an institution that realises values is justified; yet also, and more importantly,
it is criticised if it does not.
33 And this is the reason why the problem of unjust law, of the validity of legal norms and
decisions, is a transcendental problem that calls the whole legal category into question and
labels some particular decisions as “flawed” or burdened by shortcomings (axiological
and therefore legal) when they are inevitably shown to be unjust after all. This aspect is
recognised in topoi like Antigone, Augustine’s magna latrocinia and “Radbruch’s formula”,
which manifest the pretension for law to be correct (Alexy) or claim that it is a practical
system that seeks moral authority (Raz). The essentially totalising and conflicting nature
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of the practical values involved in the legal institution —the values of justice or, more
accurately, the demands of injustice28— are what make the concept of law draw from
philosophy, and what makes legal philosophy a practical philosophy.
34 Justificative legal rationality thus rests upon a constant practical effort to connect or
combine partes extra partes with respect to law. This practical process, far from reflecting
a  “pre-established  harmony”,  is  essentially  “open”,  asymmetrical  and  controversial,
which results both from the fact that legal practices must constantly adjust to the flow of
first-degree  social  practices  and  from  its  own  independent  institutional  logic  as
“technical” device. Parts of law interfere with parts of morality and with parts of politics
in different ways, at different levels, and not always (if ever) harmoniously.29 But the
tensions among them must nonetheless be recomposed in a unifying justification in the
guise of ultimate totalisations of the values involved. This includes the tensions that exist
between the efficacy of power or authority and substantive validity; between justice and
legal  security;  between dura  lex,  sed  lex and  summum ius,  summa iniuria ;  between the
political limits of law and the aspirations of universal rights; between the sociocultural,
idiosyncratic uniqueness of each legal community and the demands of universal critical
morality;  between  the  institutional  values  of  legal  technique  (associated  with  the
continuity of past operations, formal equality, specific interpretative patterns, etc.) and
the  substantive  values  of  justice;  between  the  very  principles  of  justice  that  law
encompasses and their necessary stabilisation through rules; between the rationality that
governs  the  legal  system  and  the  inevitable  presence  of  irrational  decisions  in  its
implementation.  Only  through  different  conceptions  of  the  internal  values  of  legal
practice (as part of the different conceptions of law) can we reach any kind of single
articulation of this essentially conflictive terrain which is capable of forging “overlapping
consensus”,  “reflective  balances”,  criteria of  “reasonability”,  “balancing”  or
“proportionality”,  “incompletely  theorised  agreements”,  etc.  This  is  the  result  of
interpretations that entail questioning the legal category as a whole in light of values,
while it also leads to the restoration of the unity of practical reason around these values.
This need to evaluatively interpret the legal category in terms of totality based on the
entire practical  realm explains that  the doctrinal  concept  of  law has epistemological
priority over all other concepts (sociological, economic, logical, etc.).30 It also determines
that  the  concept  of  law  is  an  “essentially  contested  concept”  or  an  “interpretative
concept”, that is, a philosophical concept, an idea. And ultimately, this is also the reason
there must be an uninterrupted, substantial continuity between the two.
35 Now the sense of the thesis that legal philosophy cannot be understood as an adjectival or 
genitive philosophy may finally be clearer, too. This would precisely be a philosophy in
which the values that concern law are not considered as transcendental. That is, they are
viewed either as values purely external to legal rationality (belonging to moral or political
philosophy but not to legal philosophy) or as values that are purely internal to the legal
institution (not connected to morality and politics, that is, not transcendental). A clear
formulation of both ideas can be found in Kelsen, when he states that “given that justice
is a postulate of the moral, the philosophy of law is a branch of moral or ethical
philosophy”. In other words, as long as it is concerned with values, philosophy of law
would no longer refer  to  law.  Thus,  the key discipline regarding law is  not  a  “legal
philosophy” but a scientific “general theory of law” the purpose of which is descriptive,
not normative. According to Kelsen, “the subject matter of this theory is the law as it
actually is, that is, positive law, both national and international”, and its purpose, in turn,
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“consists of analysing the structure of positive law and setting the fundamental notions
in the knowledge of this law”.31 This idea is what has prevailed in the core currents of
contemporary legal positivism, in its zealous attempt to separate what law is from what it
should be, of isolating “conceptual issues” from “normative issues”. Hart even considers
this  the  nuclear  positivist  thesis.32 Indeed,  legal  positivism  is  the  most  emblematic
(though not the only) embodiment of the viewpoint that assumes that the substantive
values of law are segregate from the field of legal philosophy or that reduces them to
strictly internal  values (technical  or categorical:  primarily the formal or institutional
values of  law).  Both assumptions entail  the liquidation of  the philosophy of  law,  the
former  because  it  would not  be  properly  a legal  philosophy but  a  moral  or  political
philosophy, and the latter because its study would no longer be philosophical but rather
scientific (or technical), as legal concepts could be reconstructed, it is said, away from any
justificative value judgement.33
36 Thus, Ferrajoli, for example, tells us that referring to the values of justice would mean
adopting an external point of view in relation to law: “the point of view of the political,
which  views  positive  law and  the  legal  institutions  of  the  diverse  legal  orders  as  a
historical,  political  or  social  product  which  must  be  constructed  (or  demolished),
defended  (or  criticised)  and  conserved  (or  transformed)”.  This  external  standpoint,
according to Ferrajoli, “assumes the values that design and project the external, ethical-
political ought of law and that allow formulate judgments on the greater or lesser degree
of  justice  (or  injustice)  of  the  law”.  Now,  “legal  theory  is  situated  on  a  completely
different level, as a formal theory limited to analysing technical-legal concepts and their
syntactic  relationships”.  This  theory  is  “formal”  or  structural,  essentially  logical  or
scientific in nature, a “meta-theory” of legal concepts that takes them as “ideologically
neutral, that is, independent of any value system internal or external to the legal systems
studied”.34 Therefore, the theory of law seeks to be the true discipline that replaces legal
philosophy scientifically —categorically.
37 Expressed in other words but with the same outcome, legal philosophy is, according to
Guastini, just a “philosophy of jurisprudence”, a “merely conceptual” analysis of jurists’
discourse, the purpose of which is “to model the concepts which can describe the law”,
but not to model the law itself, “in no way influencing the identification of the content of
law itself, which, by hypothesis, is not in dispute when debating in philosophy of law”.35
In sum, the values of law are only identified as attributed social facts, not as values whose
recognition entails a practical compromise which turns any discourse on them into a
normative discourse  and,  in  particular,  the  discourse  of  legal  philosophy. 36 This
compromise would involve no more than epistemic values, excluding substantive ones; the
goal would simply be to describe evaluations, those which are present in the justification
of law, without this then requiring a justificatory or normative theory. The values that
make law a  normative  and justificative  institution are  only  transferred theoretical  or
epistemological values, but not necessarily practical values (either shared or rejected).37
Legal  philosophy is  not  normative  or  practical  in  a  strong justificatory  sense,  but  a
theoretical (“conceptual” or exempt from normativity) undertaking.
38 It seems obvious, however, that philosophical criticism on this standpoint can only be
made in epistemological and ontological terms, as mentioned above. On the one hand,
this criticism must show that the philosophical attempt of conceptually reconstructing
legal  validity  as  stripped  of  value  is  based  on  an  erroneous understanding  of  the
epistemology of the legal-normative discourse and its conditions of scientific validity. The
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legal category is not scientific precisely because legal concepts —the concepts of legal
dogmatics,  of  the  “general  theory  of  law”  and  its  successor,  legal  theory  viewed  as
“science”— are structurally evaluative and grounded upon stances that are irremediably
moral  and  political.  Therefore,  there  is  no  legal  science  capable  of  epistemically
(“theoretically”)  distancing  or  freeing  itself  from the  practical  compromise  with  the
substantive values of law. Any metalinguistic or metatheoretical discourse that deals with
the legal concepts in which these values are captured performs functions internally to the
object language of legal practice as it belongs to the grammar of this praxis. These are
functions of  legitimation or  criticism that  make it  more a  meta-language of  law (i.e,
internally  generated  from  the  internal  or  participant  point  of  view  in  order  to
conceptually “close” the legal category) than about law. But neither the technical nor the
scientific (doctrinal) legal concepts manage to render the legal category “closed” or self-
referential; on the contrary, their practical dimension determines that legal normativity
has a permanently open structure38 and necessarily refers to other moral and political
categories or notions. The fact that the legal category is not strictly scientific or technical
but rather a doctrinal practice in no way diminishes its rationality; it only means that it is
a practical, political-moral kind of rationality whose concepts can only be articulated and
“closed” in a unitary way by making use of philosophical ideas dealing with political-
moral  values.  Is  such  an  evaluatively  committed  character  of  legal  rationality  what
determines then that, despite its categoricity, it is neither scientific nor can it be qua tale
scientifically reconstructed.
39 Thus, the “pragmatics” of legal theory, Ferrajoli tells us, is about the very principles of law
(that is, its values) viewed as the “logic” guiding it, but as iuris tantum and not iuris et de
iure principles, given that the nomodynamic structure of law, subjected to divergences
and historical contingencies, will not always make it possible for them to be satisfied.39
This is simply another way of saying that law is a practical undertaking whose purpose is
to totalise these values, which remain in conflict inside and outside the legal category and
should  therefore  not  solely  be  viewed  as  epistemic  (logical),  purely  descriptive  and
analytical, that is, theoretical values. They involve practical engagement in substantive
conceptions of justice articulated through different combinations and specifications of
those principles.  Only in this  way do they allow for  the ethical-political  criticism of
established  law,  a  kind  of  criticism that  is  then both  internal  and external,  that  is,
transcendental or philosophical. The pragmatics of legal theory is yet another dimension
of legal practice: legal theory is not a theoretical  discipline according to any minimally
rigorous  definition  of  the  term,40 and  this  is  the  fundamental  meaning  behind  the
statement that legal philosophy is a practical philosophy. The set of epistemological ideas
upon which legal philosophy critically examines legal rationality in argumentative terms
—ideas  such  as  “interpretation”,  “correction”,  “logic”,  “argument”,  “truth”,
“objectivity”— reveals the primacy of the justificatory dimension of legal praxis and its
internal connection to moral and political value judgments.41 
40 On the other hand, the ontological consequences of what has been said so far can only
point to the fact that the “reality” of the law is a practical undertaking anchored in a
political or institutional system of authority, which simultaneously tries to seek moral
validity or justification. This means that it supplies reasons whose scope necessarily goes
beyond the contingency of any social “fact” or source, any convention or ideology, and
links up with values that should be viewed as objective, historical-culturally developed
ideas,  which any kind of legal discourse has to engage in by incorporating a claim to
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practical  correctness.  These  ideas  (which  are  primarily  the  ideals  of  justice  and
rationality that constitute legal argumentative practice, themselves at the root of the
philosophical dialectic of classical Greece) show that what law “should be” can thus not
be uprooted from its reality or being, but is rather internal to it, as are the conceptions
about  it  operating  within  legal  rationality.  This  not  only  renders  philosophically
inconsistent  any axiological  scepticism or radical  criticism which strives to deny the
objectivity or validity of the evaluative reasons of law by reducing values to facts (e.g. to
ideologies, social conventions or mere disguises of the strategic mechanisms of power); it
also  makes  legal  positivism  itself  particularly  self-destructive  and  blind  to  the  true
practical nature of law, in that it strives to be compatible (like “ethical positivism”) with
any kind of moral objectivism.42 After all, the thesis of the separation or segregation of
law from moral values would itself be a normative or moral thesis that rests upon what it
is trying to deny: the fact that moral values are not only present but constitutive of the
concept of law. They could no longer be seen as merely “conceptual”, in the sense of
“epistemic” or “attributed” values, but instead as substantive practical values. This entails
a  normative  conception  of  legal  theory  and  therefore  an  understanding  of  this  as
practical philosophy.
41 Hence, finally, the discourse of legal values —legal axiology— cannot be viewed as a third 
discourse or a part  of  the philosophy of  law independent from the discourse on the
concept of law (legal ontology) or its forms of knowledge (legal epistemology), as it is
commonly viewed. This would be nothing other than an inherited prejudice from the
positivistic view of law, and not only a prejudice but also a hindrance. The conception
that is most coherent with the true position that law occupies within the political-moral
space  —precisely  because  values  are  so  central  to  it—,  that  is,  the  post-positivistic
conception which we call  constitutionalism or the argumentative view of law,  means
transcending this methodical view of free-value positivism and instead envisioning the
philosophy of law as a practical philosophy integrated in moral and political philosophy.
The universality of the concept or knowledge of law (and therefore, the universality of
legal philosophy) cannot be encapsulated within a single categorical enclosure, as if it
were  a  “natural”,  “criterial”  or  “semantic”  (that  is,  scientific)  concept.  The  idea  of
constructing  a  universal  concept  of  law  has  been  present  in  the  history  of  legal
philosophy since ancient times (from the Greek koinos nomos and the Roman ius gentium to
mediaeval natural law and modern rational law or the positivistic “general theory of
law”),  but  it  has  always  been a  truly philosophical  project.  The  concept  of  law is  an
“interpretative  concept”  constructed  upon  ideas  and  conceptions  of  a  philosophical
nature  which  are  present  in  legal  practice  and  in  the  doctrinal  concepts  of  law
methodologically linked to its internal justificative point of view —to jurist’s prudentia
iuris.43 What is truly universal in law should thus be values themselves understood as
ideas that seek to be transcendental and from which it is possible to overtake (critically
totalise) the contingent or particularist historical anchor of such justificative practice.
The categoricity of legal institutions and norms is contextual, always fragmented into
idiographic  and idiorhythmic  regional  circles  (national  states,  legal  families,  cultural
traditions, etc.), because norms can be abstract objects but also individuals in the logical
sense.  Only  values  would  be  susceptible  to  true  universalisation,  as  they  play  their
justificatory role in objective terms and so become the genuine ideas that make legal
practice a rational, universalisable practice. Law will lose what actually makes it rational
if these ideas cease to be present. And inasmuch as legal philosophy strives to do without
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them, to present itself as more “technical” or more “scientific”, it will put at risk its own
claim to universality, which belongs not to a theoretical but a practical philosophy. 
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NOTES
1. Atienza (1989: 371); see also Díaz (1992: 334, 369).
2. Bueno (1970; 1999).
3. However, “transcendentality” would then have not an aprioristic or metaphysical meaning (as
it does in Kant) but a meaning relative to a posteriori recurrence of practical human rationality
(Bueno 1970; 1999). A similar perspective can be found in Nagel 2000.
4. “What is there to be said about the ‘nature’ of legal phenomena beyond that which emerges
from the doctrinal study of law, which has these very phenomena as its subject?” (Ross 1959: 6).
5. “It  is  understood  that  the  preference  for  the  works  of  jurists  who  raise  themselves  to
philosophy more than for those of them who lower themselves to the world of law reveals the
preference for one method or, more accurately, for a certain working style which is easier to find
in the work of the former than the latter: What characterises this working style is the primacy
attached to analysis over synthesis, a primacy grounded upon the conviction that even though
analysis and synthesis are necessary steps in all  inquiry, analysis without synthesis (which is
what philosopher-jurists are often blamed for) is preferable to synthesis without analysis (which
is a common vice among jurist-philosophers), because the former at least seeks good materials to
construct, and because the latter only builds houses of sand where no one wants to live.” (Bobbio
1990a: 96).
6. Bobbio’s core argument is that even though it may be more analytical than synthetic and have
philosophical  aspirations  that  are  not  rigorously  systematic,  jurists’  philosophy  of  law  is a
reflection developed from empirical, positivistic materials precisely because it comes from jurists
who are working “grounded” in law, whereas philosophers’ philosophy of law is an eminently
dogmatic,  aprioristic philosophy (ancilla philosophiae),  an “applied philosophy” of systems and
doctrines extrinsic to the field of law in which the general problems of law are studied not by
dealing with legal experience but from those prior systems, thus giving rise to speculative and
rcductionist constructs, which fully justifies jurists’ traditional mistrust of philosophy.
7. The expressions are drawn from Cotterrell 2014.
8. Judging from the names he mentions (Hobbes, Ihering, Gény, Ehrlich, Kelsen, Kantorowicz,
Ross,  Hart),  we  can  glean  that  Bobbio’s  jurists’  philosophy  is  primarily  affiliated  with  legal
positivism,  while  as  prototypes  of  the  philosophers’  philosophy  he  cites  Thomism  or
Hegelianism.  As  is  well  known,  Bobbio  was  also  very  influenced  by  logical  positivism in  his
understanding of the relations between science and philosophy. Otherwise, his direct adversary
in this 1962 paper —and this explains its polemical, antimetaphysical purposes— is the Italian
idealist-Hegelian  legal  philosopher  Giovanni  Gentile,  “an  extreme  example  of  philosophical
radicalization and hipostatization” (Bobbio 1990a: 96).
9. A  similar  three-way  division  can  be  found  in  Oakeshott  2007  when  he  talks  about  legal
philosophy as  an “applied philosophy”,  as  an “a  priori natural  law” and as  a  “philosophy of
jurisprudence”. They stand in opposition to genuine “philosophical jurisprudence”.
10. Some people have even dismissed positivistic legal philosophy with an analytical orientation
as “scholastic” (Dworkin 2006: 213) or have condemned its distance from the practical interests
of jurisprudence (Cotterrell 2014; Postema 2015). These are the same disparaging attributes of
which Bobbio accuses “philosophers’” philosophy of law.
11. Kant (1798) 1968b: 28.
12. By “dogmatic philosophy” I mean any kind that envisions itself not as a reflective, secondary
knowledge  but  as  an  original,  radical  or  first-order  one,  a  kind  of  substantive,  previous
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knowledge that does not draw from sources outside itself but instead is “applied” top-down, as a
system  of  “truths”,  on  contents  or  matters  that  in  themselves  are  merely  subsequent  and
secondary (a “general function” that is realised or verified ex post in “monotonous” variables).
Dogmatic philosophy is any purely academicist or professorial philosophy that presents itself as
a closed, finished doctrine and claims to be founded upon timeless or ahistorical principles; it is
not  embedded within  the  historical,  practical  and  scientific  present  but  instead  consists  of
fundamental truths which are exempt from categorical realities,  situated above or apart from
them like a philosophia perennis.
13. This can be seen, for example, in Raz’s distinction between the “concept” and the “nature” of
law (Raz 1995: 195ff.; 2009: 17ff., 91ff.).
14. Kant (1797) 1968: 229-230 (“Einleitung in die Rechtslehre”, § B). 
15. The formation of classical philosophy is closely linked to the discussion against sophists and
orators around the concept of law (nomos) and the ideals of justice (dike, dikaiosyne, to dikaion).
From here not only arises the logic, the dialectic and the rhetoric, within the context of the polis
democracy based on the discursive technique of logos as public reason (isegoria, isonomia), but the
entire political and ethical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. See e.g. Jaeger 1946: 99ff.; 1982. This
makes  practical  philosophy the true  “first  philosophy” (Baracchi  2008).  But  it  is  also  deeply
connected  to  the  second main  source  of  philosophy  —the  emergence  of  scientific,  universal
knowledge with mathematics—, since the geometrical conception of cosmos pursues, in Vernant’s
words, a “rationalization of political relations” that seeks “less to put the city in harmony with
the sacred order of the universe than to achieve precise political purposes” (Vernant 1985: 193ss.,
356). A similar combination of practical philosophy and scientific rationalism will repeat itself
again in Modern Age and Enlightenment philosophy within the context of the modern state.
16. Cf. Viehweg 1991: 35, 44ff.
17. Thus Bobbio himself  assumes this  when he ends his  paper by redirecting the opposition
between philosophers’ and jurists’ legal philosophy to a last philosophical choice (“a difference
between  two  modes  of  philosophizing”)  between  monism  vs.  pluralism  and  rationalism  vs.
empiricism (Bobbio 1990a: 98), being the jurists more inclined towards the second option within
these dichotomies —that is, as said, giving priority to analysis over synthesis. It should be noted,
however, that for Bobbio this does not necessarily imply a sharp analytical fragmentation of legal
philosophy in the specialized subdisciplines he distinguishes (legal theory, theory of legal science
and theory of justice). For in the last paragraph of his paper he states that a “unitary discipline”
would be the best way for legal philosophy to play its practical, critical role (a role pretty close,
indeed, to a “critical totalisation”): “The task of the philosophy of law, from the didactic point of
view, is to break the dikes that keep the traditional legal disciplines in the artificial reservoir of a
positive system. This objective can be better fulfilled by mining the dam on several sides at a
time” (Bobbio 1990a: 99).
18. Pound 2002: 30ff., passim.
19. It is common knowledge that in relation to concepts, Kant’s ideas of practical reason have a
constitutive or “categorical” use, not a regulative use with the purpose of providing them with
unity or totality.
20. Alexy 2005: 45ff.
21. Waldron 1994: 527ff.
22. Raz 1990: 187.
23. Dworkin 2006: 35.
24. Atienza 2013: 284.
25. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: V.
26. Rawls 1993: 212ff.
27. Dworkin 1986: 404ff.
28. Sen 2009.
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29. Nino 1994.
30. On the “logical primacy of the internal point of view of human practice”, see Nino 1994: 37,
47.
31. Kelsen 1962: 131.
32. Hart 1987: 37ff.
33. See a clear and early formulation of both theses in Bobbio 1990b. The general theory of law is
factual,  formal,  scientific,  non-philosophical  and  deals  exclusively  with  the  concept  of  law,
whereas the philosophy of law is evaluative, material and confined to the idea of justice as a
matter of value and ideological stance. “Filosofia del diritto nel senso proprio è solo la teoria
della giustizia” (Bobbio 1950: 96).
34. Ferrajoli 2008: 28ff., 45, 49ff.
35. Guastini 2011: 7ff., 9.
36. Raz 1995: 235ff.
37. Marmor 2011: 129ff.
38. This is a philosophically recognised idea from Aristotle’s epieikeia to Hart’s open texture.
39. Ferrajoli 2008: 57ff.
40. Postema 1998.
41. On the priority of the material (that is, practical) conception of legal argumentation over the
formal (logic) and pragmatic (dialectical and rhetorical), see Atienza 2013.
42. Waldron 2001.
43. Dworkin is far and away the legal philosopher who has best captured this point, when he
claims that constitutional judges make philosophical decisions, not only occasionally before a
particular hard case (i.e., a case that questions the foundations), but as a matter of routine, given
that  the  concepts  they  use  in  their  decisions  (“responsibility,  meaning,  intention,  equality,
freedom and democracy, for instance”) are “hard concepts” (i.e. ideas) that require deploying an
argumentative or reflective practice on some of the deeper issues of political morality (Dworkin
2010: 22, 29, 33).
ABSTRACTS
My purpose in this paper is to make a case for the strictly philosophical nature of our discipline,
legal philosophy. I first take a prior stance on the issue of what philosophy is in general and
outline  some premises  for  the  definition  of  philosophical  rationality.  This  then  leads me to
critically examine Bobbio’s dichotomy between jurists’ legal philosophy and philosophers’ legal
philosophy.  It  is  essential  to  reformulate  the  relationships  between  legal  philosophy  as  a
“special” or “regional” discipline as opposed to “general” philosophy. So thirdly, I re-examine
this problem using the distinction between concepts of law and ideas in law. Fourthly, I defend
the thesis that,  when ascertaining the type of philosophy the philosophy of law is,  the most
decisive factor is  not so much (or not only)  the relationship between philosophy of  law and
philosophy in general as, more importantly, the relationship between it and law itself. I argue
that  the  nature  of  law  itself  makes  its  practice  inevitably  and  ineluctably  associated  with
philosophical ideas and conceptions. This practical view of law is tightly bound with a view of
legal  philosophy  as  a  practical  philosophy,  and  this  is  the  main  thesis  I  shall  defend  here.
Different  expressions of  this  practical  view of  law can be found in prominent  contemporary
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authors  who go  beyond the  dichotomy of  legal  positivism-natural  law (such as  Nino,  Alexy,
Dworkin, Atienza). The essential feature which I regard ties philosophy of law to the condition of
some “practical philosophy” is the role played by the concept of value, i.e. the centrality and pre-
eminence of its evaluative dimension.
INDEX




Universidad de Alicante (Spain)
E-mail: jesus.vega@ua.es
Legal philosophy as practical philosophy
Revus, 34 | 2018
24
